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et al.: FRE and NY Evidence Comparison

RULE 613: PRIOR STATEMENTS OF

WITNESSES
Federal Rule of Evidence 613 states:
(a) Examining witness concerning prior statement. In examining
a witness concerning a prior statement made by the witness,
whether written or not, the statement need not be shown nor its
contents disclosed to the witness at that time, but on request the
same shall be shown or disclosed to opposing counsel.
(b) Extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statement of witness.
Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness
is not admissible unless the witness is afforded an opportunity to
explain or deny the same and the opposite party is afforded an
opportunity to interrogate the witness thereon, or the interests of
justice otherwise require. This provision does not apply to
admissions of a party-opponent as defined in rule 801(d)(2). 1
Federal Rule of Evidence 613 governs "foundational
requirements for the introduction of prior inconsistent statements,
written or oral, made by witnesses who have testified before the
court." 2 The rule is broken down into two sections. The first
section, 613(a), explains the circumstances under which a prior
statement must be disclosed. 3 Generally, disclosure of a prior
statement must be made only upon the request of opposing
counsel. 4 In addition, Rule 613(a) provides that a prior
inconsistent statement may be used to impeach a witness'
credibility regardless of whether it was written or oral, without
the necessity that the witness know the contents of the statement

1. FED. R. EviD. 613. See also JACK B. WEqnSTEIN & MARGARET A.
613 [01]--4], at 1-33; MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE §§ 36-38, at 47-52 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
2. WEINSTEIn & BERGER, supra note 1, 613[01], at 6.
3. FED. R. EvID. 613(a).
4. GLENN WEISSENBERGER, WEISsENBERGER'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 613.2, at 321-22 (2d ed. 1995) ("Rule 613(a) provides that on request the
statement must be shown or disclosed to opposing counsel. Through this
procedure, the party offering the witness may protect him from unfair
insinuations or misleading questions by making appropriate objections.").
BERGER, WEINSTEIN ON EVIDNCE
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before testifying. 5 Under either circumstance, the statement may

be the subject of cross-examination or may be corroborated by an
additional witness after the witness sought to be impeached has
testified. 6 The rationale behind this method, also referred to as

the

"self-contradiction"' 7 method

of impeachment,

is to

"demonstrate [to the trier of fact] that the witness is the type of

person who makes conflicting statements regarding the same set
of facts" and, thus, the testimony is inherently untrustworthy. 8
In United States v. Lawson,9 the government sought to impeach

a defense alibi witness with inconsistent statements she had
previously made to an FBI agent concerning the defendant's
whereabouts when a robbery was committed. 10 After numerous

requests for the prior statements were made by defense counsel
and denied by the government, the court stated that the

statements should have been disclosed. 1 1 The court reasoned that
Rule 613(a) does not give the trial judge discretion to decide
whether or not a party has the obligation to disclose or show the
5. See WEISSENBERGER, supra note 4, § 613.2, at 321; see, e.g., United
States v. Marks, 816 F.2d 1207 (7th Cir. 1987) (acknowledging that a party is
no longer required to disclose contents of a prior inconsistent statement to a
witness); Wood v. Stibl Inc., 705 F.2d 1101, 1109 (9th Cir. 1983) (concluding
that trial court erred in refusing to permit the defendant to question a witness
about a prior statement until he questioned witness as to whether the prior
statement was inconsistent with evidence presented at trial); United States v.
Williams, 668 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that the trial court
committed error in denying admission of prior inconsistent statement into
evidence).
6. See WEISSENBERGER, supra note 4, § 613.1, at 320.
7. See Id. (describing this impeachment device as a self-contradiction
because a witness is questioned about a statement made prior to trial which is
inconsistent with the trial testimony).
8. Id.; see also United States v. O'Connor, 750 F. Supp. 90, 92
(W.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that testimony given before a grand jury may be
used to impeach the defendant where such testimony was "material to the
jury's evaluation of the credibility ...

of the defendant's denial").

9. 683 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1982). Defendant was convicted of bank
robbery and "sentenced on three counts to concurrent prison term of 12 years,
10 years, and 12 years, respectively." Id. at 689.
10. Id. at 694.
11. Id.
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opposing party the statement; 12 rather, it is an absolute
obligation. 13
The second section of Rule 613 governs the admissibility of
extrinsic evidence to prove prior inconsistent statements of a
witness. 14 Rule 613(b) provides that extrinsic evidence of a prior
inconsistent statement is not admissible unless the witness is
given ample opportunity to explain or deny the statement. 15
Further, the rule provides that the opposing party be afforded an
opportunity to question the witness about the statement, or do
whatever is required in the interests of justice. 16
In applying Rule 613(b), the Second Circuit has stated that
when a witness denies making any prior inconsistent statement
about relevant events, the opposing party is not required to lay a
preliminary foundation in order to impeach the witness with a
prior inconsistent statement. 17 In United States v. Harvey, 18 the
12. Id.
13. Id. Rule 613 "flatly commands disclosure of a document such as this
to opposing counsel." Id.
14. FED. R. EviD. 613(b). See WEISSENBERGER, supra note 4, § 613.3, at
322 ("[E]xtrinsic evidence may assume the form of testimony from another
witness, or it may be a document containing the inconsistent statement. [It is]
evidence introduced other than through the testimony of the witness who is the
subjiect of the impeachment.").
15. FED. R. EviD. 613 (b).
16. Id. WVEISSENBERGER, supra note 4, § 613.4, at 323 ("Rule 613 (b)
affords the trial judge discretion to permit the introduction of extrinsic
evidence in the absence of an opportunity for an explanation from the witness
where 'the interests of justice ... require.'"). Judges, in using their
discretion, will admit or not admit evidence depending on the "practicability of
recalling the witness, the materiality of the issue to which the statement
relates, the probable impact on the trial by not allowing introduction of the
statement, and the effectiveness of a jury instruction in restricting the
consideration of the statement by the jury." WEISSENBERGER, supra note 4.
§ 613.4, at 323. See, e.g., United States v. Int'l Business Machs. Corp.. 432
F. Supp. 138 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); United States v. McKinney, 954 F.2d 471 7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1023 (1992).
17. Gray v. Busch Entertainment Corp.. 886 F.2d 14, 16 t2d Cir. l)99
Plaintiff alleged that her injury on an amusement park train ride was sustained
when she slipped on something before taking her seat on the train. Id. at 15.
Although plaintiff's daughter denied making any statements about the accident.
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court explained that this rule is a relaxation of traditional
foundation requirements. 19 Traditionally, on cross-examination, a
witness' attention was directed "to the time and place of the
statement and to whom it was made."' 20 After the enactment of
the rule, the only requirement is that the witness "be provided an

'opportunity

to

explain

or

deny

a

prior

inconsistent

statement.'-21

Unlike the Federal Rules of Evidence, New York courts have
followed a different approach. In Loughlin v. Brassil,22 the New
York Court of Appeals stated that a proper foundation must be

laid before prior inconsistent statements will be admissible. 23
More recently, in People v. Fiedorczyk,24 the Appellate Division
the trial court correctly admitted a first aid report made by the daughter to the
park nurse explaining that her mother injured herself after stepping back to
take a picture. Id. at 15-16. The court explained that "[b]ecause... [she] had
previously testified that she made no statement whatsoever concerning the
accident, .

.

. the challenged portion of the report was admissible as a prior

inconsistent statement." Id. at 16.
18. 547 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1976).
19. Id. at 722. Defendant was convicted on charges of bank robbery and
larceny. Id. at 721. The Government had only one identification witness, Mrs.
Martin. Id. While testifying, she admitted to knowing the defendant, but
denied that she had prior arguments with him, or that she had previously
accused him of fathering her child and failing to support the child. Id. at 722.
The Second Circuit held that the trial court incorrectly omitted testimony from
defendant's mother which would have shown Mrs. Martin's bias toward the
defendant. Id.
20. Id. at 722.
21. Id. (citing FED. R. EvID. 613(b)).
22. 187 N.Y. 128, 79 N.E. 854 (1907). The plaintiff sustained injuries
when his hand was caught in a press. Id. at 130, 79 N.E. at 855. Plaintiff
alleged that the accident occurred as a result of a bolt that dropped out of
place. Id. Another employee testified that on that morning he had tightened the
nut that holds the bolt and that it was still in place after the accident. Id. at
133, 79 N.E. at 856. The court held that a proper foundation had not been laid
when the plaintiff's mother offered testimony to contradict that of the
employee's. Id. at 134, 79 N.E. at 855.
23. Id. at 133-34, 79 N.E. at 856.
24. 159 A.D.2d 585, 552 N.Y.S.2d 443 (2d Dep't), appeal denied, 76
N.Y.2d 788, 559 N.E.2d 687, 559 N.Y.S.2d 993 (1990). After being robbed.
the complainant identified the defendant as two of the gang members who
robbed him. Id. at 585, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 444. Defendant contended that the
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noted that laying a foundation "prevent[s] surprise and give[s] the
witness the first opportunity to explain any apparent
inconsistency between his testimony at trial and his previous
statements ... "25 In laying a proper foundation, the witness
must be "questioned as to the time, place and substance of the

prior statement." 26

New York law provides that a written inconsistent statement
should be shown to the witness and the witness should be given
the opportunity to deny writing or making the statement. 27 In
Larkin v. Nassau Electric Railroad Co., 2 8 the New York Court
of Appeals explained that "[a]ny statement of a witness made out
of court, orally or in writing, if contradictory of a material part
of his testimony, may be, if properly proven, introduced in
evidence, not as substantive proof of the truth of such statement.
but as tending to discredit him. "29 The court also said that -[a]
court erred by not allowing him to call two officers as witnesses in order to
show that the complainant allegedly made contradictory statements to them. Id.
at 586. 552 N.Y.S.2d at 444. The court held that the lower court's ruling was
proper because the defendant was trying to impeach the complainant through
the officer's testimony, without allowing the complainant to be cross
examined. Id. at 587, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 445.
25. Id. at 586, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 445.
26. Id. at 586, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 445.
27. Romertze v. The East River Nat'l Bank, 49 N.Y. 577, 581-82 (1872).
28. 205 N.Y. 267, 98 N.E. 465 (1912). A witness for the plaintiff in an
accident case gave favorable material testimony for the plaintiff. Id. at 268, 98
N.E. at 466. During cross-examination, the witness was shown a typewritten
statement that he had signed which contained several inconsistencies. Id. His
explanation for the inconsistencies was that he dictated the statement to
someone, but had not personally checked the finished statement for errors
before he signed it. Id. When the defendant offered the statement into
evidence, the court sustained the plaintiff's objection to the statement as
incompetent and excluded it. Id. The court held that once a contradictory
statement has been shown to the witness, it may be "proven and introduced in
evidence in the regular course of the trial." Id.
29. Id. at 268-69, 98 N.E. at 466 (1912). See also Matter of Roge v.
Valentine, 280 N.Y. 268, 20 N.E.2d 751 (1939) (holding that "[tihe rule has
long been established that prior contradictory statements, whether made in
court under oath or outside of court orally or in writing, may in proper case be
introduced to impeach the credibility of a witness . . ."). Id. at 276, 20 N.E.2d
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witness cannot be impeached by statements alleged to have been
made by him ... until he has been adequately warned by the
cross-examination that those statements will be later offered
against him .
,30 If the statement is oral, the witness must be
asked whether he did or did not, at a given time and place, in the
presence of or to anyone, make the alleged statements. 3 1 If the
statement is in writing, the writing must be shown or read to the
witness. 32 Once the witness is made aware of these statements,
"they may be proven and introduced in evidence in the regular
33
course of the trial."
In addition, New York's impeachment rule is codified in New
York Civil Practice Law and Rules section 4514 [hereinafter
C.P.L.R.]. 34 C.P.L.R. section 4514 provides that. in addition to
the common law impeachment rules, any party may impeach a
witness' testimony with a written statement or a statement made
under oath. 35 When introducing these written documents or
statements, the examiner must lay a proper foundation. In People
v. Welch, 36 the court held that the prosecution's method of
impeaching his own witness was improper when he introduced
"in wholesale form" the contents of the witness' affidavits after

at 754. Roge applied this rule to include check stubs and notations upon record

cards, holding that in proper cases they might be introduced "to impeach a
witness, or as admissions when made by a party to the action." Id. at 277, 20
N.E.2d at 754-55. See also JEROME PRINCE, RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE

§ 501, at 486-88 (10th ed. 1973).
30. Larkin, 205 N.Y. at 269, 98 N.E. at 466.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.

34. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 4514 (McKinney 1992). Section 4514

states: "In addition to impeachment in the manner permitted by common law,
any party may introduce proof that any witness has made a prior statement
inconsistent with his testimony if the statement was made in a writing
subscribed by him or was made under oath." Id.
35. Id. See also Letendre v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 21
N.Y.2d 523, 236 N.E.2d 467, 298 N.Y.S.2d 183 (1968) (holding that a
former employee's written statements admitting that he stole from his
employer were admissible to impeach his credibility).
36. 16 A.D.2d 554, 229 N.Y.S.2d 909 (4th Dep't 1962).
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two unfavorable answers. 37 The court held that the prosecutor
should have asked permission to ask leading questions "and then
put to the witness relevant substantive questions." 3 8
The differences between Rule 613 and New York's common
law39 approach to prior statements of witnesses are primarily
procedural. The most significant difference is New York's
requirement that a foundation be laid before the prior inconsistent
statement is introduced. Under the federal rule, this requirement
has been abolished. New York law, however, requires a specific
foundation be laid prior to the admission of the prior statement.
Such a foundation includes whether one made a statement, the
time of the statement, the place where it was made, to whom it
was made, and the substance of the statement. 40 Furthermore,
New York imposes a requirement that a written statement be
shown to the witness, and that the witness be given an
opportunity to correct or explain the statement. 4 1 Conversely,
Rule 613 specifically states that a statement need not be shown
nor its substance revealed to the witness at the time of
examination; however, it must be shown to opposing counsel
upon request. 42

37. Id. at 558, 229 N.Y.S.2d at 914.
38. Id. at 559, 229 N.Y.S.2d at 914.

39. The New York rule on prior inconsistent statements is governed by the
common law and statutory codification of the common law with the additional
provision that a party may introduce proof of a prior statement inconsistent
with his testimony if the statement is in writing or under oath. See N.Y. Cir.
PRAc. L. & R. 4514, supra note 34.
40. See PRINCE, supra note 29, § 502, at 488.
41. See PPINCE, supra note 29, § 502, at 488.
42. FED. R. EvrD. 613(a).
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